The recent Supreme Court judgment 137/2017 of 1 March (rec 2672/2014) considers that the criteria to calculate the amount of goodwill (clientele) compensation in a distribution contract cannot follow the criterion of the “gross margin” obtained by the distributor, but the “net margin”. In order to reach this conclusion, the Court follows its judgment 356/2016 of 30 May (rec 148/2014), which refers to the Judgement 39/2010 referring to 697/2007 of 22 June (rec. 2943/2000).

At present it seemed that the Supreme Court was inclined to calculate the clientele compensation in distribution agreements on “gross margin” as an analogy with Article 28 of Agency Act. Does this imply a change in case law?

According to well-established jurisprudence [see Supreme Court Judgment 1392/2008 of January 15, rec. 4344/2000)], a distributor may be entitled to goodwill (clientele) compensation if the inspirational idea of article 28 of the Agency Contract Law was applied by analogy. However, since there is no “remuneration” in distribution contracts such as that received by the agent (commissions or fixed amounts), but “commercial margins“, the question was whether the “gross margin” (difference between the purchase and resale price) or the “net margin” (the same difference but deducing other expenses and taxes) should be considered as the basis for this compensation. The conclusion accepted by the Supreme Court until now seemed that it was necessary to calculate the compensation on the “gross margin” being a magnitude more comparable to the “remuneration” of the agent: it was not possible to deduce other expenses and taxes, just as for the agent those same expenses and taxes were not deduced.

However, the new Judgment seems to accept the contrary and to support the calculation of clientele compensation in distribution agreements on net margins. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the reading done by the Supreme is not correct.

In the 2017 ruling, the difference between gross/net margin is mentioned referring to judgment 356/2016 of May 30. In that judgment of 2016, it was said that although in a previous Judgement 39/2010 was not concluded on whether the calculation had to be made on gross or net amounts, in a previous one (Judgment 296/2007) it was, nevertheless, accepted that the net profit obtained by the distributor (by deducing expenses and taxes) was similar to the remuneration of the agent, and not the gross margin which is the mere difference between prices of purchase and resale.

This said, in my opinion, in its Judgment of 2016, the Supreme Court did not use a correct reference when leaning on the one of 2007 for something that the latter did not say. In fact, in 2007, the Supreme Court did not quantify the goodwill (clientele) compensation, but the damages compensation. More specifically, the Court said in 2007 that “goodwill (clientele) compensation might be clearly requested in the complaint, without any confusion or ambiguity“, and after that, the Court concluded that it “should resolve according to the terms in which the debate … was raised in the initial claim. And since this one was interested in compensation for damages mainly based on the length of time the relationship … the most appropriate solution according to the case law of this Court … is to set as compensation for damages on an amount equivalent to the net profits that the plaintiff obtained by the distribution of the products of the defendant during the year immediately preceding the extinction of the contract“. Therefore, the Court did not analyse in 2007 goodwill (clientele) compensation, but damages compensation.

Then the conclusion followed in 2007 to calculate the damages indemnification on net margins, was then followed in 2016 but to calculate the clientele compensation and reiterated now in the 2017 Judgement with the same conclusions.

Regardless of all this, and also in my opinion, it does not make much sense that if the analogy with the Agency Contract is applied, any amount (such as taxes or other expenses) should be deducted from the gross margins to reach a net margin. If the intention is to analogously apply the “remuneration perceived by the agent”, it seems clear that the agent has also expenses and also pays taxes; nothing in Directive 86/653/EEC nor in the Spanish Agency Act says that it must be deducted anything from the “received” amount in order to calculate the goodwill (clientele) compensation. If the amounts the agent perceives are the commissions (from which he will pay his taxes, his rent expenses, employees, etc. obtaining his “net profit”), the same criteria should apply in a distribution contract.

In conclusion, and in my opinion, the Judgment of 137/2017 only emphasizes what I consider to be a previous error and adds additional confusion to a question that is already very much discussed: the analogous application of goodwill (clientele) compensation to distribution contracts and its method of calculation.

NOTE: The Supreme Court seems to confirm this judgement by a new one in May 19 2017 signed by the same Judge.

A new disposition (Act 29/2015, of July 30) on international legal cooperation in civil matters has come into force. The Act introduces many new features on the matter and in particular, how to prove foreign law that might be applicable to the case.

The regulation on foreign law applicable in the procedures in Spain is quite curious. So far, the only procedural reference was Article 281.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, not very clear about the consequences of lawyers not proving enough the foreign law that they intend to enforce. It was clear that the judges had always the power to investigate on their own and apply that foreign law it, but what if they did not? In fact, too often judges did not investigate and simply applied the Spanish law. However, in the absence of a procedural rule protecting against such decisions, the judgment was always poorly substantiated in possible appeals.

Article 33.3 of the new Act provides that, in cases in which the parties have not fully justified the content and validity of foreign law, the Spanish law may exceptionally apply.

Therefore, it seems that it could be decided: in case the client will be better defended by a foreign applicable law, we’ll worry about its justification before the Judge; but if it was more interesting the application of the Spanish law, we will leave the initiative to the other party to prove and justify it. The justification of a foreign law is usually expensive and if the law now applies “exceptionally” the Spanish one, I am convinced that very few judges will take the initiative to investigate the foreign law, though they still retain this power.